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THE CELTIC TIGER ROARS DEFIANTLY:
CORPORATION TAX IN IRELAND AND
COMPETITION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
I.  INTRODUCTION
As economic and political accord within the European Union
(EU) becomes more and more of a reality, the whole that is the
European Common Market struggles to maintain a unity that
overrides almost inevitable tensions created by the strong cultural
personalities of its parts.  Ireland, since its incorporation into the EU,
has fought economically and politically to assert the independent
identity that accompanied the country’s incredible economic growth
and earned it the nickname “The Celtic Tiger.”
One of the most commonly cited explanations for Ireland’s
economic growth from the early 1990s is its low rate of corporation
tax, among the lowest in the European Union.1  Direct national tax
policy is generally outside the scope of the legal framework of
Europe’s economic and political union.  However, because a state’s
rates of taxation may lure business operations from one country to
another, the potential anti-competitive effects of a state’s corporate
taxation rates suggest the applicability of EU anti-competition treaty
provisions and policies to assert EU jurisdiction over national
taxation policies.
Part II of this note will address the EU’s legal framework for
national direct corporation tax policies within the European Common
Market.  Part III will examine the national legal framework for
Ireland’s corporation tax system.  Part IV will assess the legal and
political challenges to Ireland’s low rate of corporation tax under EU
law.  This Note concludes that the EU’s current legal framework for
eliminating competition between Member States is an ineffective
Copyright © 2000 by Julia R. Blue.
1. See Jessica Poyner, Investment in Ireland: The Enticement of U.S. High-tech Industry to
the Emerald Isle, 10 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 195 (1997).
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weapon against a state’s domestic corporate tax policies; currently,
harmonization of corporation tax rates in the Common Market is
neither legally nor politically feasible.
II.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK: CORPORATE TAXATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
A. Corporate Taxation and the EC Treaty
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(“EC Treaty”) was signed in Rome in 1957, and it established a
Common Market by “[eliminating] the barriers which divide
Europe.”2  Article 2 establishes a Common Market marked by “the
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and
balanced expansion, increased economic stability, a rise in the
standard of living in Europe and closer relations among Member
States.”3  The drafters intended a lack of inter-Member State
competition and free movement of capital, labor, and goods to
promote the social goals of economic stability and an increased
standard of living.4  The EC Treaty thus calls for “the establishment
of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted” in the
Common Market.5  The EC Treaty envisions two paths to integration:
“positive integration” by legislative intervention aimed at
harmonizing Member States’ policies and national legislation and
“negative integration” through the removal of pre-existing barriers to
economic harmonization.6
In order to advance the Common Market and minimize
distortion of competition between the Member States, Title V of the
EC Treaty discourages economic subsidies or taxes that impact
certain sectors or industries.7  Article 85 outlines specific practices
that are considered “incompatible” with the Common Market,
including price fixing, discrimination, and unfair trade practices.8  The
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Pmbl., 258
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958), amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (effective July 1,
1987) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
3. GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 8 (1993).
4. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 8(a).
5. Id. art. 3(f).
6. See ADOLFO J. MARTIN JIMENEZ, TOWARDS CORPORATE TAX HARMONIZATION IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AN INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS (1999).
7. See generally EC Treaty, supra note 2, tit. V.
8. See id.
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Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which amended the pre-
existing EC Treaty, added Article 103, which declares that Member
States should “regard their economic policies as a matter of common
concern.”9 
Direct taxes, as distinguished from indirect taxes in Article 99 of
the EC Treaty, provide revenue for a state through duties imposed
upon its citizens or entities doing business within its borders.10  Title
V, Chapter 2 of the EC Treaty links taxation to the free movement of
goods.11  Although the Treaty does not explicitly label direct taxation
policies as a potential source of distortion of competition between
Member States, the EC Treaty expressly prohibits discriminatory
indirect taxation on transactions in goods.12  Additionally, Members
States’ tax laws, direct and indirect, are required to comply with the
“fundamental freedoms” of the EC Treaty.  Member States may
restrict the free movement of capital only to the extent necessary to
ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.13  They may not
restrict the free movement of capital,14 nor may they restrict freedom
of establishment within the Community.15  Article 220 of the EC
Treaty, however, addresses direct taxation by urging Member States
to negotiate double taxation treaties in order to eliminate double
taxation within the Common Market.16
Article 100 of the EC Treaty represents a potential legal basis for
a challenge to a Member State’s internal direct taxation policies.17
Article 100 provides that “the Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the [European] Commission, issue directives for the
approximation of such provisions . . . as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the Common Market.”18  The only
condition for application of Article 100 is that a Member State’s
9. JIMENEZ, supra note 6, at 205.
10. See generally EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 99; see also BEN TERRA & PETER WATTEL,
EUROPEAN TAX LAW 69-71 (1993).
11. See generally EC Treaty, supra note 2, tit. V, ch. 2.
12. See id. arts. 95-97, 99.  Indirect taxation includes turnover taxes, excise duties, or any
other internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.  See
id., arts. 95, 99.  Transactions in goods are any transactions involving products of member states.
See id., art. 95.
13. See id. art. 67
14. See id.
15. See id. art. 52.
16. See id. art. 220.
17. Id. art. 100.
18. Id.
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internal legislation immediately impact the Common Market.19
Challenging a national tax policy under Article 100 would be a
difficult task, however, due to the article’s requirement of a
unanimous Council vote.20  Because each Member State may veto any
Council directive, any Member State defending its direct taxation
scheme would possess the power to strike down the challenge.
Additionally, in accordance with Article 189 of the EC Treaty, any
directives promulgated under Article 100 would have to be
implemented into national law through legislative measures in each of
the Member States.21
Member States may not provide any preferential economic
subsidies or other aid if such aid is found to “distort” or “threaten to
distort” competition between Member States.22  Exceptions to this
rule and procedures to be followed in the event of a violation are
delineated in Article 92(2) and (3).23  Article 92(2)(a) deems
compatible with the Common Market any aid that “has a social
character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products
concerned.”24  Relief for natural disasters or relief related to the
German reunification falls under Article 92(2)(b),25 while aid to
promote projects or development within economically depressed
areas and programs related to culture or heritage conservation fall
under Article 92(2)(b)(3).26  Furthermore, Article 92(3) states that
“aid to promote the economic development of areas where the
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
unemployment” is “considered to be compatible with the Common
Market.”27
B. Legislative and Community-Level Initiatives
The idea that Member States’ direct taxation schemes may
impede attainment of goals of economic integration represented by
19. See id.; see also Jan E. Brinkmann & Andreas O. Riecker, European Company
Taxation: The Ruding Committee Reports Gives Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus, 27 INT’L
LAW. 1061, 1063 (1993).
20. See BERMANN et. al, supra note 3.
21. See JEAN-MARC TIRARD, CORPORATE TAXATION IN EU COUNTRIES (1994).
22. Id.
23. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 92(2)-(3).
24. Id. art. 92(2)(a).
25. Id. art. 92(2)(b); see id. art. 92(2)(c).
26. Id. art. 92(2)(b).
27. Id. art. 92(3).
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the establishment of a European Common Market is not a new
concern.  Both the 1963 Neumark Report28 and the Van Den Tempel
Report,29 distributed in 1971, discussed the need for a harmonized
corporation tax scheme throughout the European Economic
Community.
The Neumark Report was the product of a committee chaired by
Professor F. Neumark of Germany and charged by the European
Commission (“Commission”) with researching the effects of
disparities among Member States’ financial systems upon the
establishment of the Common Market.30  The Neumark Report
addressed general principles governing tax harmonization and made
recommendations regarding all taxes that could hamper the Common
Market.31  It noted the independent development of the various
European fiscal systems, and acknowledged that these differences
should thus be considered in devising a common taxation method.32
The committee ultimately believed that any unification of tax systems
would fail due to political considerations and would not eliminate
distortions of competition between Member States.33  Nonetheless,
the Neumark Report concluded by recommending a single corporate
tax rate within the EEC and a multilateral tax convention establishing
the details and financial suprastructure of a community-wide tax
scheme.34
The Commission responded to the Neumark Report with a
program entitled “Program for the Harmonization of Direct Taxes,”
which proposed (1) harmonization of the withholding taxes on
payment dividends and interest; (2) elimination of discrimination
against non-residents, financial intermediaries, and holding
companies to facilitate cross border mergers and acquisitions; and (3)
28. See Rapporto del Comitato Fiscale e Finanziario, Commissione: Bruxelles (1962)
[Report of Fiscal and Financial Committee], 2 Common Mkt Rep. § 3211.03 (1975) [hereinafter
Neumark Report].
29. See Impôt Sur les Sociétés et Impôt Sur le Revenue dans les Communautés Européenes,
in COLLECTION ETUDES, SÈRIE CONCURRENCE, RAPPROCHEMENT DES LEGISLATIONS, No.
15 (1970), discussed in JIMINEZ, supra note 6, at 110 [hereinafter Van Den Tempel Report].
30. See generally Neumark Report, supra note 28.
31. See id.  For a general discussion of the Neumark Report, see JIMINEZ , supra note 6, at
107; see also L.G.M. Stevens, Introduction and Summary, in A.L. BOVENBERG ET AL.,
HARMONIZATION OF COMPANY TAXATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: SOME
COMMENTS ON THE RUDING COMMITTEE REPORT 5 (1992).
32. See JIMINEZ, supra note 6, at 108.
33. See Neumark Report, supra note 28 (the text of the report makes this statement but
does not provide support for it).
34. See id.
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harmonization of amortization systems.35  Thus, the Commission did
not respond to the Neumark Report’s call to devise a single rate of
direct company taxation across the Community.
In 1970, the Commission appointed A.J. Van Den Tempel, a
Dutch financier, to head a committee to report on corporate taxation
and its effect on the internal market.36  The Van Den Tempel Report
suggested that the EEC follow the Dutch model of corporate
taxation, which would result in double taxation on the income of
corporations residing in one Member State but deriving income from
operations in another Member State.37  The Van Den Tempel Report
suggested that the Dutch model’s simplicity and neutrality offered a
potential starting point from which the EC could develop a
harmonized corporate tax system.38
The European Parliament opposed a 1975 “Action Program” to
implement a single corporate tax rate and structure.39  The delegates
felt that a “full and real harmonization could not be achieved without
harmonizing the tax base,” and the proposal contained only an
imputation system through which Member States would apply a tax
rate ranging from 45 to 55 percent.40  The Commission planned to
supplement the 1975 proposal with this missing layer of detail, but no
new proposals materialized.41  The European Commission withdrew
this proposal on April 20, 1990. It then shifted its focus from tax
harmonization to the elimination of corporate double taxation and
issues pertaining to indirect taxes.42
The Commission charged a committee in 1990 with exploring
Member States’ corporation tax policies and elucidating any potential
anti-competitive effects the national tax mechanisms had upon the
Common Market.  The committee, chaired by Onno Ruding, a
former Dutch finance minister, was charged with answering the
following questions:
(1) Do differences in taxation among Member States cause major
distortions in the internal market, particularly with respect to
35. See Programme d’Harmonization des Impôts Directs, Communication de la
Commission au Conseil de 26 Juin 1967, Supplement to Bulletin No. 8, Commission of CEE,
Brussels, cited in JIMINEZ, supra note 6, at 108.
36. See Van Den Tempel Report, supra note 29.
37. See id.
38. See JIMINEZ, supra note 6, at 117.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Brinkman & Riecker, supra note 19, at 1065.
42. See id.
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investment decisions and competition?  (2) In so far as such
distortions arise, are they likely to be eliminated simply through the
interplay of market forces and tax competition between Member
States, or is action at the Community level required?  (3) What
specific measures are required at the Community level to mitigate
these distortions?43
The Ruding Committee issued its report on March 10, 1992.  It
proposed a directive to eliminate withholding taxes on cross-border
payments of interest and royalties between companies,44 proposed a
directive on cross-border loss compensation,45 and recommended that
a pre-existing Parent-Subsidiary and Merger Directive be extended in
scope.46  Because of the unanimity requirement for corporate taxation
measures, none of these proposals was passed by the Council.47
The Ruding Committee Report studied the economic distortions
resulting from Member States’ divergent tax systems and concluded
that tax rates and the formulation of the basis upon which income
taxes would be imposed do in fact have enormous effects on business
decisions.48  The Committee divided the issue into two subparts: the
objective question of whether differences in tax burdens are relevant
to the profitability of an investment project, and the subjective
question of whether business people perceive tax differentials as an
important factor.49
Regarding the objective question, the Ruding Committee Report
found that interest rates and inflation rates are as important as
national taxation policies in a business’ decision to locate in one
jurisdiction over another.50  However, if interest and inflation rates
are excluded, differences in tax regulations still have a substantial
effect.51  The committee found that: “(a) there are clear differences in
tax burdens on domestic corporations in various Member States, (b)
that there is overall discrimination against foreign investors, and (c)
43. F.J.G.M. Vanistendael, A Personal View, in BOVENBERG ET AL., supra note 31, at 13-
15 (addressing the author’s views and experiences as a member of the Ruding Committee).  The
economic aspects of the Ruding Report’s findings are examined more closely infra Part III.
44. See id. at 13.
45. See id. at 23-28.
46. See id.
47. See European Commission, Company Taxation: Current Position and Outlook (visited
Apr. 17, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26036.htm>.
48. See Vanistendael, supra note 43, at 19.
49. See id.
50. See TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 10, at 88.
51. See Vanistendael, supra note 43, at 19.
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that a foreign investor is faced with very different tax burdens on his
investments in each individual Member State.”52
As to the subjective impact of tax differentials on business
decisions, the committee found that
for all elements of the business organization, tax considerations
were always or usually relevant in 57.9 percent (sales outlets) to
85.1 percent (financial service centers) of the cases.  For financial
service centers, tax considerations were always a major factor in
52.6 percent of the cases, confirming the empirical evidence that
financial services activities are sensitive to variations in tax
burdens.53
Of particular importance to the Irish taxation system was the Ruding
Committee’s finding that tax rates and tax incentives are the
instruments with the greatest impact on business decisions.54  The
report surveyed Community businesses to determine whether these
entities would prefer that the Community tackle competitive
distortion caused by tax discrepancies between Member States, or
whether they believed that free market forces would bring about
convergence.55  The Ruding Committee reported that 74 percent of
businesses were in favor of Community action toward tax
harmonization, and 26 percent were in favor of leaving convergence
to market forces.56
At the Verona meeting of ECOFIN members in April 1996, the
Commission addressed concerns about the potential anti-competitive
effects of Member States’ corporate tax policies.57  In response, the
Commission established the High Level Group, which was later
replaced by the Taxation Policy Group.58  These groups consisted of
personal representatives of the Member States’ Finance Ministries.
They were chaired by the Commission and were charged with
addressing the proposals of the Ruding Committee.59  On December
1, 1997, under the direction of the Taxation Policy Group, the
Ministers of Finance agreed on a tax package to reduce harmful tax
competition, including a draft of the Code of Conduct on Direct
52. Id at 20.
53. Id.
54. See TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 10, at 88.
55. See Vanistendael, supra note 43, at 22.
56. See id.
57. See JIMINEZ, supra note 6, at 142-43.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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Business Taxation (“Code of Conduct”).60  On March 9, 1998, the
ECOFIN Council created the Code of Conduct Group to address the
implementation of the provisions outlined in the Code of Conduct.
Each Member State and the Commission appointed a high-level
representative and a deputy to represent it in the drafting of the Code
of Conduct.  The Group currently meets at least twice a year “to
facilitate the political orientation of its work,”61 and the group’s goal is
the elimination of harmful national taxation measures by December
31, 2002.62
The Code of Conduct was approved on December 1, 1997 as a
political commitment by Member States to refrain from adopting
markedly low corporate taxation rates that would be harmful to
competition and to phase out rates that currently violate the
commitment within five years.63  The Code of Conduct applies Article
92 and 93 of the EC Treaty to measures relating to direct business
taxation and calls for “the strict application of the aid rules
concerned.”64  The Code of Conduct outlines five criteria for
determining whether a tax measure “affects, or may affect, in a
significant way the location of business activity in the Community.”65
These are:
(1) whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in
respect of transactions carried out with non-residents, or (2)
whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic market, so
they do not affect the national tax base, or (3) whether advantages
are granted without any real economic activity, or substantial
economic presence within the Member State offering such tax
advantages, or (4) whether the basis of profit determination in
respect of activities within a multinational group of companies
departs from internationally accepted principles, notably those
agreed upon within the OECD, or (5) whether the tax measures
lack transparency, including where statutory rules are relaxed at
administrative level [sic] in a non-transparent way.66
60. EUR. COMM., Code of Good Conduct in the Field of Direct Company Taxation,
Official Document No. 2061, Dec. 3, 1997, at 2.2.1 [hereinafter Code of Conduct].
61. Vanistendael, supra note 43, at 22.
62. See id.
63. See EUR. COMM., Commission Notice on the Application of State Aid Rules to
Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation (Dec. 10, 1998), Commission Notice 384/03,
1998 J.O. (C 384/3) 1 [hereinafter Commission Notice on Business Taxation].
64. Id.
65. Code of Conduct, supra note 60, at 2.2.1, Annex 1.
66. Id.
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These provisions quelled any question as to whether the State Aid
provisions of the EC Treaty applied to direct business taxation and, as
will be discussed below at length, led the European Commission to
reassess the nature of Ireland’s ten percent corporation tax in light of
the anti-competition provisions Title V.67
The European Commission released another notice in December
1998, which clarified the application of the State Aid provisions of
Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty to direct business taxation.68  The
Commission stated that the goal of the Code of Conduct was to
“improve transparency in the tax area through a system of
information exchanges between Member States and of assessment of
any tax measures that may be covered by [the Code of Conduct].”69
The notice provided for an analysis of the tax provisions currently in
force in Member States and established the European Union’s
stronger position on the regulation of national tax matters.  Two days
later, the Commission published an assessment of Ireland’s
corporation tax, which will be discussed at length below.70
C. Judicial Initiatives: Corporate Taxation and the European Court
of Justice
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has endorsed the
application of the doctrine of direct effect, which presumes that
Community legal norms are the “law of the land in the sphere of
application of Community law.”71  Likewise, the supremacy doctrine
ensures that in a conflict between Community law and the law of a
Member State, Community law will apply.72  The ECJ’s application of
these doctrines to questions of competition and State Aid has had a
profound impact on the interpretation of the EC Treaty provisions
that relate to direct taxation, even though the EC Treaty itself is silent
on the issue.73  Most of the case law in this area centers on the four
67. See Proposal For Appropriate Measures Under Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty
Concerning Irish Corporation Tax (Dec. 12, 1998), Commission Regulation 395/09, 1998 J.O. (C
395/19) 1 [hereinafter Irish Tax Proposal].
68. See Commission Notice on Business Taxation, supra note 63.
69. Id. at 1.
70. See generally Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67.
71. JIMINEZ, supra note 6, at 206.
72. See id.
73. See supra Part I.
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freedoms: the free movement of goods,74 free movement of persons,75
freedom of establishment,76 and free movement of capital.77  These
decisions do not address a Member State’s national tax policy or
corporation tax rate because they usually involve an individual
taxpayer and enforcement of non-discrimination principles.
However, the provisions of the EC Treaty on State Aid at issue in the
case of Ireland’s corporation tax have also been addressed by the ECJ
and are the focus of this discussion.
The ECJ has defined State Aid in an extremely broad manner
and opened the door to Commission review of Member States’
legislation on state intervention in the Common Market.78  In De
Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority, the ECJ effectively equated the
definition of State Aid to the definition of a subsidy and clarified the
potential discriminatory and anti-competitive effects that such aid
may have.79  In another case, the ECJ held that national courts possess
jurisdiction to review challenges to a potentially anti-competitive
State Aid regime that falls under the prohibitions in Articles 92 and
93 of the EC Treaty.80  In Italian Government v. Commission, the
Court defined the scope of Article 92’s prohibition on illegal State
Aid:
The aim of Article 92 is to prevent trade between Member States
from being affected by benefits granted by the public authorities
which, in various forms, distort or threaten to distort competition
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods.  Accordingly, Article 92 does not distinguish between the
measures of State intervention concerned by reference to their
causes or aims but defines them in relation to their effects.
Consequently, the alleged fiscal nature or social aim of the measure
in issue cannot suffice to shield it from the application of Article
92.81
74. See Case 18/84, Commission v. France, 1985 E.C.R. 1339; see also Case C-69/88, H.
Krantz GmbH & Co. v. Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Staat der Nederlanden 1990
E.C.R. I-583.
75. See Case 44/72, Marsman v. Rosskamp, 1972 E.C.R. 1243.
76. See, e.g., Case 14/76, Bloos, S.P.R.L. v. Société en Commandite par Actions de Bouyer,
1976 E.C.R. 1497.
77. See, e.g., Case 267/86, Van Eycke v. ASPA NV, 1988 E.C.R. 4769.
78. See Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community, 1961 E.C.R. 1.
79. See id. at 3.
80. See Case 173/73, Italian Govt. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 709.
81. Id. at 718-19.
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This case provided the Commission with the language to challenge
Ireland’s corporation tax rates in 1997.  In Lorenz v. Germany,82 the
Court gave the Commission the power to compel a Member State to
modify or repeal a State Aid scheme that the Commission unilaterally
decides is contrary to Article 92.83
Although the ECJ’s April 1998 opinion in Safir v.
Skattemyndigheten I Dalarnas Ln84 addressed national tax rates in
relation to the freedom to provide services, Safir could be interpreted
as the Court’s willingness to assess Member States’ policies of direct
taxation in the context of the anti-competition provisions of the EC
Treaty.  In Safir, the ECJ declared a national tax policy to be contrary
to the spirit of the European Common Market.85  Safir purchased a
life insurance policy from a company outside Sweden and challenged
Sweden’s tax on the premium paid to the foreign corporation by a
Swedish national.86  Sweden placed the burden of filing forms
containing information on the location and identity of the foreign
insurance company on the Swedish taxpayer.87  The Court agreed with
Safir, who claimed a violation of Article 60 of the EC Treaty, which
ensures that businesses in the service sector will enjoy equal
treatment in their dealings with or in any Member State.88  The Court
held that Sweden hindered foreign companies by forcing their
potential customers to endure additional burdens when purchasing
insurance policies, burdens that did not apply to customers of
Swedish insurers.89  However, the Court did not address the
compatibility of Sweden’s policy with Article 73(d), which
acknowledges the right of a Member State to legislate its own
national tax policy.  Although this case is of limited application to a
general tax rate applied consistently by a Member State, it may
provide a stepping stone whereby the Court will assert its authority to
rule in the name of the Common Market.
82. See Case 120/73, Lorenz GmbH v. Germany and the Land Rheinland/Pfalz, 1973
E.C.R. 1471.
83. See id. at 1480.
84. See Case C-118/96, Safir v. Skattemyndigheten I Dalarnas Ln, 1998 E.C.R. I-1897.
85. See Safir, 1998 E.C.R at I-1898.
86. See id. at I-1898.
87. See id. at I-1898.
88. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 60.  The text of Article 60 reads in relevant part:
“Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of establishment, the
person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the State
where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own
nationals.”  Id.
89. See Safir, 1998 E.C.R. at I-1928.
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Though the Court did not address whether the Common Market
policy of Article 100 supersedes national sovereignty, as represented
by Article 73(d), Safir may indicate an increased willingness on the
part of the EU to call national tax schemes into question in the name
of the Common Market.  As the Court stated in Safir, “It must be
observed first of all that, although, as Community law stands at
present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview of the
Community, the powers retained by the Member States must
nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law.”90
III.  IRISH LEGAL FRAMEWORK: CORPORATION TAX LAW
AND POLICY IN IRELAND
In order to combat such economic woes as inflation and
unemployment, Ireland established a corporation tax structure that
boasts the lowest rates in the EU.91  In the 1950s, Ireland opened its
markets and placed a zero rate of taxation on corporations in export
industries.92  This policy eventually gave way to the need for
additional revenue, but since 1976, Ireland’s rate of taxation on
corporate profits has generally decreased from a high of fifty
percent.93  Prior to the Finance Act of 1999,94 the maximum rate of tax
on corporations in Ireland was 32 percent, with a reduced rate of 28
percent on the first £50,000 of a corporation’s profit.95
The most significant provisions of Ireland’s taxation scheme at
issue with the European Commission were introduced in Ireland’s
Finance Act of 1980.96  The Act provides for a 10 percent tax rate on
corporations operating in “manufacturing” and “manufacturing
related services,”97 with a liberal definition of the term
“manufacturing.”98  In addition to maintaining the reduced tax rate,
90. Id. at I-1925.
91. See Anthony Garvey, Irish Tax Pledge to Protect Multinationals, ELECTRONICS TIMES,
Dec. 7, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 13433700.  For detailed information on the Irish
corporation tax rate structure, see generally FRANK BRENNAN & PAUL MOORE,
CORPORATION TAX (9th ed. 1997).
92. See Therese Raphael, Ireland’s European Rivals Are Green With Envy, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Dec. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL-WSJE 21156751.
93. See Institute of Taxation in Ireland, Rates of Corporation Tax (visited April 1, 2000)
<http://www.taxireland.ie/irishtax/index.htm >.
94. Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
95. See BRENNAN & MOORE, supra note 91, at 8.
96. Finance Act, No. 14 (1980); see Poyner, supra note 1, at 210.
97. See Finance Act, No. 14 § 39 (1980).
98. For a comprehensive listing of industries that qualify for the reduced corporation tax
rate and those that are excluded, see Institute of Taxation in Ireland, Manufacturing Relief and
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the Finance Act of 1984 introduced “Relief for Investment in
Corporate Trades,” which grants individual taxpayers a deduction for
investments made in companies that qualify for the 10 percent rate.99
The percent rate was originally scheduled to remain in effect through
December 31, 2000, but in 1990, the Irish government extended its
application through December 31, 2010.100
Gradually, Irish tax policymakers increased the scope of sectors
entitled to the lower rate of taxation.  For instance, the Finance Act
of 1981 added fish farms, engineering services, and shipbuilding to the
list of industries qualifying for the reduced tax rate.101  In 1984, to
encourage Ireland’s emerging high-technology sector, data
processing, computer software companies, and “software
development services”102 were added to the list.  This sector was also
included in a list of industries for which individuals could deduct
private capital investments.103  The 1986 Finance Act included
research and development companies in the list of qualifying
industries, though individual investors in these companies were not
permitted to deduct their investments.104  Later Finance Acts added
even more industries to the list of industries qualifying for both the 10
percent tax rate and investment deductions: shipping activities,105
export sales from “trading houses,”106 plant cultivation by way of
“micro-propagation and plant cloning,”107 meat and fish processing,108
remanufacture or repair of computer equipment,109 and repair or
maintenance of aircraft110 and aircraft components.111  Other industries
were afforded the reduced tax rate but were denied deductions for
individual investors, such as newspaper advertising companies112 and
Investment in Corporate Trades (visited April 1, 2000) <http://www.taxireland.ie/irishtax/index.
htm>.
99. See Finance Act, No. 9  §§ 11-27 (1984), as amended by Finance Act, No. 10 §§ 8-12
(1987) and Finance Act, No. 13 § 9 (1989).
100. See Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 64.
101. Finance Act, No. 16 § 17 (1981).
102. Finance Act, No. 9 §45 (1984).
103. See id.
104. See Finance Act, No. 13 §24 (1986).
105. See Finance Act, No. 10 §§ 11, 28 (1987).
106. Id. §§ 22, 29.
107. Id. § 31; see also Finance Act, No. 12 §7 (1988).
108. See Finance Act, No. 10 § 41 (1990).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Finance Act, No. 13 §44 (1993).
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service activities for ships or off-shore platforms.113  It is thus apparent
that Ireland’s preferential tax rate was aimed at a vast range of
economic enterprises.
The goal of such low corporation tax rates was to decrease
inflation and unemployment, and the statistical data suggest that the
program was successful.  Economic growth boomed after the tax
reforms; since 1993, GDP growth has averaged 8 percent annually.114
Unemployment has fallen from 16 percent to 7.8 percent (compared
with over 10 percent in Germany and France) and is expected to fall
to below 5 percent over the next few years.115  Revenues from
corporate taxes in 1999 were 3.5 percent of GDP, double the amount
in 1990.116  The tax rates have stimulated Ireland’s economy
dramatically and have brought multinational corporations such as
Dell, Intel, and Pfizer within the country’s borders.117
As previously noted, Irish corporation taxes are among the
lowest in the European Union.  The 10 percent rate on profits
generated by the aforementioned categories of corporations contrasts
starkly with the 45 percent rate in Germany118 and France’s rate of
33.33 percent.119  Not surprisingly, Germany and France have led the
attack on Ireland’s corporate tax rates.  Objecting that the rates
distort competition between EU Member States, they have advocated
the need to “harmonize” taxes within the EU.120  Germany, for one, is
not rushing to decrease its corporate tax rates, which are among the
highest in the Europe.  Germans have pointed out that their 11.46
billion ecu annual contribution constitutes 60 percent of the EU’s
budget,121 while Ireland is a net beneficiary, receiving 2.8 billion ecu of
aid annually.122  This cash flow makes it increasingly difficult for
113. See Finance Act, No. 10 §42 (1990).
114. See Raphael, supra note 92, at 12.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Ernst & Young, Doing Business in Germany, Corporate Tax Guide (visited Apr.
17, 2000) <http://www.doingbusinessin.com/start/index.cfm>.
119. See Ernst & Young, Doing Business in France, Corporate Tax Guide (visited Apr. 17,
2000) <http://www.doingbusinessin.com/start/index.cfm>.
120. See Raphael, supra note 92, at 13.
121. See Dennis Staunton, Hoping to Impress Europe’s Paymaster—the Strong Links
Between Ireland and Germany Will Be Confirmed When the Taoiseach Meets the German
Chancellor, Mr Schroeder, In Bonn Today, But All Is Not Sweetness and Light, IR. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1998, at 17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Itimes File.
122. See id.
BLUE.DOC 06/22/00  8:17 PM
458 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 10:443
Germans to watch their corporate taxpayers flee for tax havens like
Luxembourg and Ireland.
In July 1987, Ireland applied to the European Commission to
have its special 10 percent corporation tax rate extended to certain
income derived from trading operations in areas of Dublin known as
the Shannon Customs-Free Airport Zone (SCAZ) and the
International Financial Service Centre (IFSC).123  The Commission
determined that singling out these areas for special tax treatment
constituted “an operating aid to their beneficiaries, as they are not
linked to the realization of any investment or other specific activities
which would not be performed by beneficiaries in the ordinary course
of their business in Ireland.”124  Ordinarily, operating aid can only be
granted under Article 92(3)(a) if it is justified in terms of its
contribution to regional development and if its level is in proportion
to the handicaps it seeks to alleviate.125  Additionally, the aid must be
limited in time and progressively reduced.126  These provisions
notwithstanding, the Commission cleared the extension of the 10
percent rate under an exception that State Aid given to
underdeveloped areas or areas suffering from an unusually low
standard of living will not be considered harmful to the Common
Market.127
Inbound investors operating in Ireland are eligible for grants
from the Industrial Development Agency (IDA).128  IDA grants
provide subsidies for the acquisition of plant sites, utilities, and labor
for foreign corporations that agree to use local labor and Irish
management.129  A corporation qualifying for an IDA grant
automatically qualifies for the 10 percent preferential corporation tax
rate.  Under the Finance Act of 1999, these corporations will be
allowed to continue to receive the governmental subsidies and low tax
rate for existing activities and any expansion projects approved by the
IDA before July 1998.  However, the preferential treatment of
foreign corporations within the designated zones will be phased out
by 2005.130
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(3)(a).
128. For a discussion of the IDA, see Poyner, supra note 1, at 201.
129. See EU Rules to Cap IDA Aid, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16, 1998, available in 1998
WL 8234621.
130. See Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67.
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Thus, although the Irish corporate taxation rates will be raised
from their previous low rates for companies operating in the
manufacturing industry, Ireland still boasts the lowest rate of
corporate taxation in the European Union.  These rates are actually
more generally applicable than they once were because all operations
producing “trading income” will be eligible to receive a low 12.5
percent rate of tax.
IV.  ANALYSIS
A. Challenges of the Irish Corporation Tax System Under EU Law
Although a Member State’s direct taxation rate remains under
national control,131 the Member States did agree in the Code of
Conduct that the European Commission on Finance must approve
any policy of taxation that may have an adverse effect on competition
in the Common Market.  Since this is a political commitment and
does not have the force of law, the Commission turned to the State
Aid provisions in Article 100 as the legal basis to force Ireland to
reformulate its corporation tax and IDA grant policies.  However,
these provisions are subject to a rule of unanimity.132  Any directive to
unify national tax systems would be met with considerable opposition,
and therefore, the issue has given way to a political push for greater
harmonization of rates of national corporate taxes.133
In 1987, the European Commission on Finance first approved
Ireland’s rate of taxation in the IFSC and SCAZ regimes, and in 1990,
it allowed for the extension of these rates through December 31,
2000.134  When the Commission considered the issue again in 1991, it
approved the further continuation of the rate in the IFSC to
December 31, 2005 for operations that began in the area before
January 1995.135  In 1994, the deadline for revoking preferential status
131. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 73d.
132. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100.
133. See Kevin Brown & Jim Kelly, Tax Harmony? No Thanks: Attempts to Reform
Taxation Across the EU Will Meet Huge Resistance, Comment & Analysis, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1999, at 17.  The article surveyed European business organizations, and found “virtually no
support for the ambitious tax reform agenda set out by the German and French finance
ministers.”  Id.
134. See EUR. COMM., Proposal for Appropriate Measures Under Article 93(1) of the EC
Treaty Concerning the International Financial Service Centre and Shannon Customs-Free
Airport Zone (December 18, 1998), Commission Notice 395/14, 1998 J.O. (C 395/14)
[hereinafter Proposal for Appropriate Measures].
135. See id.
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to corporations that had pre-existing operations in both preferred
zones was extended to December 31, 2000; the 10 percent rate for
these industries would remain in place through December 2005.136
However, from 1997 to 1999, Ireland felt considerable political
pressure from the EU to raise its corporation tax rate and to phase
out its preferential treatment of businesses within the SCAZ and the
IFSC.137  For example, although British Prime Minister Tony Blair
and German Chancellor Gerhard Shröder were firmly opposed to a
single corporate taxation system, they issued a joint statement in
December 1998 that supported “tough action to combat unfair tax
competition in line with the Code of Conduct Group” and stated that
“discriminatory tax rules and practices should generally be removed
to prevent the distortion of competition within the EU.”138
Furthermore, following the passage of the Code of Conduct in 1997,
the Commission exercised its newly–articulated power to assess
taxation in Member States.
The Commission issued a notice in December 1998 that declared
the tax schemes for the IFSC and the SCAZ to be “operating aid”
because the aid was linked to activities that would ordinarily be
associated with the businesses’ normal operations.139  In order for this
operating aid to be authorized, it must be justified as a contribution to
regional development and must be proportional to the degree of
underdevelopment in that region.140  However, the Commission found
that Ireland’s preferential tax schemes had accomplished their
intended purposes because unemployment rates had decreased to an
acceptable level and the GDP had been increasing at a steady and
rapid rate.141  Since the IFSC and SCAZ could “no longer be
considered compatible with the Common Market,” the Commission
revoked the approval for the IFSC and SCAZ as regions in need of
State Aid.142
The Commission, deriving its jurisdiction from the Code of
Conduct, then addressed the status of the Irish Republic as an
136. See European Commission Press Release IP/98/691/B, Commission Addresses
Recommendations to Ireland Regarding Corporate Tax, July 1998.
137. See id.
138. Brown & Kelly, supra note 133, at 19.
139. See Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67, at 1; see also Proposal for Appropriate Measures
Under Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty Concerning the International Financial Service Centre
and Shannon Customs-Free Airport Zone, supra note 134.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
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approved region for State Aid.143  According to Article 92(1) of the
EC Treaty, aid “represents a benefit to an undertaking by enabling it
to retain a greater proportion of its profits either for distribution to its
members or its shareholders or for reinvestment and therefore
confers an advantage on eligible undertakings.”144  The Commission
first decided that tax systems could be considered aid “granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever”
because reduced tax receipts for a Member State are “equivalent to
the consumption of state resources.”145  Second, in order for a state
action to be considered State Aid, it must “favor certain undertakings
or the production of certain goods.”146  The Commission ruled that
this condition was met through the Irish corporation tax scheme’s
preferential treatment of the manufacturing and service sectors and
that a justification for a lower rate of tax on certain sectors of the
economy no longer exists.147  Furthermore, according to the
Commission, an assessment of the validity of a State Aid system
hinges on its potential effect on trade between states rather than on
the purpose behind the State Aid program.148  Since the lower tax rate
improves a corporation’s competitive position due to higher profit
retention, the Commission determined that competition between
Member States is distorted.149  Thus, the Commission concluded that
“the measure constitutes a State Aid and [the Commission] has
registered the [Irish corporation tax] scheme as an existing aid.”150
In response to this, Ireland and the European Commission
negotiated the Finance Act of 1999, which the European Commission
officially sanctioned in a notice dated December 18, 1998.151  Ireland
promises to set corporation taxes on trading income to 12.5 percent
and rates on non-trading income to 25 percent, effective January 2003
through 2025.152  This agreement was announced on July 22, 1998 in a
press release issued by the Minister for Finance and the Minister for
Enterprise, Trade, and Employment.  The goal of the agreement was
143. See Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67.
144. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(1).
145. Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67.
146. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(1).
147. See Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
152. See Mary Walsh, Ireland, EU Agree to Major Changes in Irish Tax Regime,
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, July 27, 1998.
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to “address a series of measures to the Irish Government which it
needs to take in order to put its corporate tax system in conformity
with European Union State Aid rules.”153
In order to preserve the legitimate expectations of investors, the
European Union’s settlement with Ireland provides for a transition
period to allow companies to remain subject to the current tax
regime.  According to the press release issued by the Commission on
July 22, 1998, “the arrangements for phasing out the preferential rate
under the [Irish corporation tax] system are spread over a longer
period, reflecting in particular the legitimate expectations acquired by
companies given that the system was, since 1980, regarded as a
general measure and not subject to the State Aid rules.”154  The length
of the transition period depends on the industry and when a company
received eligibility for IDA grants or preferential treatment by
operating within the IFSC or SCAZ regimes.155  The EU has approved
the extension of a 10 percent taxation rate through 2010 for inbound
investment projects approved by the IDA before May 31, 1998.156
Companies operating under the preferential IFSC and SCAZ regimes
will continue to receive the 10 percent rate through 2005.157
The EU affirmed the measures that Ireland and other Member
States had planned for eliminating the incompatibility with the
Common Market.  In order to eliminate the requirement for
“discrimination” within the Commission’s analysis of Article 92(1),
the new 12.5 percent rate for all corporate trading income profits
attempts to “favor certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods.”158  Ireland’s previous distinction between “manufacturing”
and “non-manufacturing” industries raised questions of
discriminatory corporate tax schedules, and the dichotomy between
the newly defined term “trading income” and other types of
corporate income could serve as ammunition for a future dispute by
the EU.  If, however, the national tax scheme is applied generally to
all corporate operating income in a nondiscriminatory fashion, it
could escape such a challenge.
153. European Commission Press Release No. IP/98/691/B, supra note 136.
154. Id.
155. See Finance Act, No. 2 (1999).
156. See European Commission Press Release No. IP/98/691/B, supra note 136.
157. See id.
158. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 92(1).
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Furthermore, Ireland may benefit from the procedural safety net
created by the Article 100 unanimity requirement.159  Article 100
states that “[t]he Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the
approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions
of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the Common Market.” 160 Only the Commission can
challenge a Member State’s potentially anti-competitive policies, and
Ireland has the power to veto any challenge that should arise.161
Finally, a claim based on the 12.5 percent rate itself would face
Article 73(d), which implicitly grants Member States the right to set
their own national tax policies.162
B. Potential Movement of State Aid Provisions and Tax Rates
The European Commission will no longer be able to characterize
Ireland’s corporation tax rate as “illegal” State Aid.  The Commission
has defined “operating aid” as “aid aimed at reducing a firm’s
operating expenses.”163  Under Article 92(3)(a) of the EC Treaty, such
aid can only be authorized in regions qualifying as areas where the
standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious
underemployment.164  Ireland, however, no longer qualifies for either
of these exemptions; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) reported in its 1999 annual economic
survey that “the Irish economy has notched up five straight years of
stunning economic performance.”165  Although the Commission’s
definition of “operating aid” would render Ireland guilty of violating
Article 92, the line must be drawn somewhere.  Any Member State’s
rate of taxation that leaves a corporation with comparatively more
remaining operating income than it would have in another
jurisdiction could theoretically be considered operating aid because it
is “aimed at reducing a firm’s operating expenses.”166  An evenly
159. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See id.
162. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 73(d).
163. European Commission Press Release No. IP/98/691/B, supra note 136.
164. See id.
165. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD
ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1998-1999—IRELAND 9 (May 1999).
166. European Commission Press Release No. IP/98/691/B, supra note 136.
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applied rate of taxation would avert a challenge under the EC
Treaty’s State Aid provisions and would be a legally sound method.
The Commission, in its application of the Treaty’s provisions on State
Aid to corporate taxation, found the following:
The main criterion in applying Article 92(1) to a tax measure is
therefore that the measure provides in favor of certain
undertakings an exception to the application of the tax system.  The
common system applicable should thus first be determined.  It must
then be examined whether the exception to the system or
differentiations within the system are justified “by the nature or
general scheme” of the tax system, that is to say, whether they
derive directly from the basic or guiding principles of the tax system
in the Member State.  If this is not the case, then State Aid is
involved.167
Therefore, a Member State’s rate of corporation tax should not be
considered “operating aid” if that rate of tax is evenly applied to
corporations operating within the Member State’s borders.
Ireland’s settlement-induced corporate tax structure may yet be
subject to another round of scrutiny under Article 92.  The impact of
a tax policy that is 20 percent lower than the average direct business
taxation rate in the rest of the EU’s Common Market will become
more difficult to downplay with the institution of a common currency.
However, such a challenge must hinge on a differentiation between
different types of undertakings, which will become more difficult to
prove with increased awareness of the ability to escape
“discrimination” through carefully worded tax policies.  Member
States can evade the EC Treaty’s proscriptions on illegal State Aid by
defining all taxable corporations in the same manner and taxing them
at the same rate.  This is evident through Ireland’s settlement
program with the EU.  Since Ireland’s legislature and courts had
defined “manufacturing” very liberally in the past, replacing it with
“trading” (which nonetheless maintains an effectively dual tax rate)
may be enough to evade another round of scrutiny under Article 92’s
anti-competition provisions.  These same tools could render the same
effect in a renewed attack on Ireland’s corporate tax scheme; such an
interpretation would require little extension of Article 92 beyond
where the Commission has already proven it is willing to proceed.
167. EUR. COMM., Irish Tax Proposal, supra note 67, at 3.
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C. Is Tax Harmonization Feasible?
Under the current regime established by the EC Treaty, tax
harmonization is not legally feasible.  Because Member States’
taxation policies are consciously omitted from the Treaty’s provisions
for economic harmonization, they are insulated from EU directives
via the unanimity requirement of Article 100.168  Furthermore,
Member States may evade EU challenges of “discrimination” by
following Ireland’s lead and defining taxable businesses in a manner
that spreads the preferential tax rates more evenly.
Although it is indisputable that corporation tax rates lure
investment activity and foreign business operations from one state
into another, those rates interact with the state’s labor policies and
regulatory framework to create an environment for businesses.169  The
pool of labor, the availability of resources, and the extent of
environmental regulation are just some of the factors that influence a
region’s attractiveness to outside businesses.170  Furthermore, as
discussed by the Ruding Committee, other internal factors, such as
interest rates and inflation, also play a role.171  According to Frances
Ruane, an economics professor at Trinity College in Dublin, most of
the foreign direct investment into Ireland has originated in the United
States, and accordingly a cultural affinity between the two nations
may be responsible to some degree for the willingness of American
businesses to locate on the island.172  Since factors other than Ireland’s
corporation tax rate may be responsible for its incredible growth in
foreign direct investment and capital flows, eliminating economic
competition between Member States is a broad goal that cannot be
achieved simply by harmonizing their taxation rates.
Moreover, the EU may actually benefit from Ireland’s tax
policies.  According to Paul Seabright, a senior research fellow at
Churchill College, Cambridge, “some investment has probably gone
to Ireland that might have gone elsewhere [on the basis of its
corporation tax policies], but some has probably come to the EU that
would not otherwise have come to Europe at all.”173  Therefore,
168. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100.
169. See Brinkman & Reicker, supra note 19, at 1067; see also data from the Ruding
Committee, discussed supra Section I.
170. See Brown & Kelly, supra note 133, at 19.
171. See Stevens, supra note 31, at 19.
172. See id.
173. Id.
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Ireland’s rapid growth has probably had some “modest spillover
effects through trade with other member states.”174
Yet another problem has been the EU’s concentration on
corporation tax rates rather than the tax base.  Since tax systems
formulate the basis upon which businesses are taxed differently, an
attack that concentrates solely on the tax rate is likely to be
superficial because it is the tax base that determines the amount of
income upon which the rate is levied.  For example, according to
Nicholas Dee of the Confederation of British Industry’s tax
committee, “[t]he UK taxes companies at a low rate.  France and
Germany have high corporate tax rates but companies there pay
much less in corporate taxes.”175
As a result of the difficulty—if not impossibility—of harmonizing
Member States’ corporate tax bases, the Ruding Committee
abandoned its call for tax harmonization.176  The Committee had
stated that the introduction of a community–wide formula for
computing a tax base might be “reconsidered when a much higher
level of integration between Member States is achieved, in particular,
when group treatment is introduced for enterprises located in
different Member States.”177
The harmonization of corporation tax rates between Member
States is neither legally nor politically feasible.  The Commission must
rely on the EC Treaty provisions on State Aid to challenge such an
internal fiscal policy, and any Member State can escape this by
applying definitions more broadly and eliminating potential claims of
discrimination.  The legal basis for a challenge will also encounter
Article 100’s veto provision.  Politically, Ireland has fought pressure
to raise its general rate of corporation tax because to some extent,
this low rate has correlated to its incredible growth in GDP and
employment.  Even if the EU achieved harmonized corporation tax
rates, the differences in Member States’ formulations of corporate tax
bases would still leave wide discrepancies in Member States’ effective
tax rates.
174. Id.
175. Brown & Kelly, supra note 133, at 19.
176. See Brinkman & Reicker, supra note 19, at 1067.
177. Id. (quoting The Ruding Committee Report, supra note 43).
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V.  CONCLUSION
The Celtic Tiger has roared its way from unemployment and
stagnation to one of the highest rates of economic growth in the
European Union.  This is due in part to its corporation tax rate and its
preferential treatment of foreign corporations doing business within
its borders, particularly those within its designated industrial zones.
Such growth has attracted critical attention from other EU Member
States and tested the issues of tax harmonization in the Common
Market, which have been debated for nearly three decades.
Ireland’s case has proven that the current EU legal framework
leaves no room to challenge individual Member States’ national
direct taxation policies.  Thus, harmonization of direct corporation
taxes within the EU is a legal impossibility without either amending
the EC Treaty to explicitly allow it or revoking the requirement of
unanimity for legislation promulgated under Article 100.
Political directives are also too weak to require Members to alter
their internal direct taxation schemes.  The Code of Conduct has
provided a political framework for Member States to work to achieve
greater harmonization of corporation taxes within their borders.
However, this Code derives its teeth from the EC Treaty provisions
on State Aid and therefore is powerless to challenge corporation tax
rates applied evenly to all corporations within a Member State.
Therefore, without the assistance of Member States’ local initiatives
and a politically palatable formula of calculating tax bases in addition
to a single tax rate, the political arena cannot bring about harmonized
corporate tax rates within the European Union.
Ireland has once again asserted its cultural and political
independence from the Continent.  Although the corporation tax
rates have been altered to some extent, they still defiantly remain
among the lowest in the EU.  Businesses will continue to flock to the
Emerald Isle, and the corporation tax rates will welcome them, as it is
unlikely that Europe can unite on the issue of domestic direct
taxation.
Julia R. Blue
